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Abstract. Normative environments for multi-agent systems provide means to 
monitor and enforce agents’ compliance to their commitments. However, when 
the normative space is imperfect, contracts to which norms apply may be unbal-
anced, and agents may exploit potential flaws to their own advantage. In this 
paper we analyze how a normative framework endowed with a simple adaptive 
deterrence sanctioning model responds to different agent populations. Agents 
are characterized by their risk tolerance and by their social attitude. We show 
that risk-averse or socially concerned populations cause lesser deterrence sanc-
tions to be imposed by the normative system. 
1   Introduction 
Interaction infrastructures for multi-agent systems have been extensively studied. 
Within such efforts, some attention has been given to normative environments (e.g. 
[1-3]), consisting of middleware that provides support for explicitly handling norma-
tive relations among agents (such as contracts specified through normative operators, 
e.g. obligations). Fewer efforts have been put on the development of dynamic capa-
bilities in normative environments, where the infrastructure itself seeks to adapt its 
enforcement policies to the actual interaction scenario that is taking place. 
In fact, when embedded in some notion of “institution”, normative environments 
take an active role in checking agents’ compliance with their commitments, and fur-
thermore in enforcing such compliance. The goal is to establish trust among partici-
pants in a norm-regulated relationship – this gives contracts a binding force. 
An important feature of interaction infrastructures with a contracting emphasis is 
the assistance of contract formation, namely by providing a normative framework that 
specifies norms applicable to different contractual settings. Given that complete con-
tract negotiation automation is not likely to be possible (both in terms of technological 
limitations and real-world acceptance), software agents may rely on background nor-
mative frameworks that fill-in the normative body of contracts. This feature is particu-
larly important when considering contrary-to-duty situations, which should describe a 
normative response in case of non-compliance to contractual terms. In certain cases, 
however, there will be no specified response. This is where other coercive approaches 
may be relevant, in situations where agents try to take advantage of their potential 
gain when violating norms (because they might be more self-interested than socially 
concerned). 
 In the literature (e.g. [4, 5]) we find two basic kinds of sanctions that an institution 
may apply in order to incentive norm compliance (or, to put it another way, to dis-
courage deviations). Direct material sanctions have an immediate effect, and consist 
of affecting the resources an agent has (e.g. by applying fines). Indirect social sanc-
tions, such as changing an agent’s reputation, may have an effect that extends through 
time. Depending on the domain and on the set of agents that inhabit the institutional 
environment, the effectiveness of such sanctions may be different: if agents are not 
able to take advantage of other agents’ reputation information, material sanctions 
should be used instead. 
There are two general policies used when applying (direct) sanctions, which con-
cern their intended effects: (i) deterrence aims at punishing the violator so as to dis-
courage future violations; (ii) retribution aims at compensating the addressee of the 
violation. Bringing these policies to an electronic institution realm, we consider that 
retribution sanctions are those specified in contractual norms, be they negotiated or 
inherited from a preexistent normative framework. In this case the institution, while 
monitoring norm compliance, acts as a mediator. As for deterrence sanctions, they 
will be applied by the institution itself, and may be used so as to maintain order (by 
motivating agents to comply) and consequently trust in the system. 
Deterrence has been studied in political science [6] with a different perspective, 
where theories are proposed for explaining international relations in tense periods 
such as the Cold War. Deterrence is based on threats between different nations. 
Economic approaches to law enforcement have suggested analyzing sanctions and 
their amplitude by taking into account their effects on parties’ activities. Agents 
committing to norms that have associated deterrence sanctions enter risky activities, 
because they may unintentionally violate them. It has been argued [7] that under strict 
liability (where violators are always sanctioned) sanctions should equal harm done. 
An increase in the level of activity brings an increase in the expected harm; if dam-
ages imposed by sanctions equal harm, parties will have socially correct incentives to 
engage in risky activities (that is, to establish commitments). However, this conclu-
sion relies on the additional assumption that parties are risk-neutral. According to [7], 
if agents are risk-averse the optimal level of damages tends to be lower than harm. 
With risk-aversion, a sanction imposes a cost which does not exist under risk neutral-
ity: risk-aversion introduces costless deterrence [8] and the policy-maker should take 
that into account when choosing the optimal sanction. 
Our normative environment model makes two simplifying assumptions: 1) strict li-
ability (norm violations are always detected); 2) costless enforcement (monitoring and 
sanctioning have a negligible cost to the institution). 
With these assumptions in place, we will describe an adaptive model for a norma-
tive framework. The model tries to avoid over-constraining the environment while 
ensuring a certain level of norm compliance, by adjusting deterrence sanctions. 
In this paper we analyze how the adaptive model responds to different agent popu-
lations, where each agent is characterized by a risk tolerance parameter and a social 
awareness parameter. The former represents an agent’s willingness to contract in the 
presence of violation fines. The latter allows us to embed in our agents some notion of 
social welfare; that is, although we will take agents as utility maximizers, agents are 
not all equally self-interested. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the reader with 
the adaptive model for deterrence sanctions, and Section 3 provides a feeling of how 
the model works with a simple scenario. Section 4 presents several experiments con-
ducted with various agent populations, with different risk tolerance and social aware-
ness distributions. Finally, Section 5 concludes. 
2   A Normative Framework with Deterrence Sanctions 
In our approach we take the stance that agents are truly autonomous, and thus cannot 
be forced to fulfill their obligations. The institution may, however, impose certain 
fines as deterrence sanctions: such fines are assumed to be fully regimented (that is, 
agents cannot escape them, e.g. because they were required, upon entering the institu-
tion, to make a deposit that is in control of the institution). 
We are mainly concerned with contracting scenarios, in which agents make mutual 
commitments and create business expectations. Violations, even when handled by 
contractual norms, are seen as abnormal situations. Thus, if a certain kind of violation 
becomes frequent, response should be taken through an increase of sanctions. 
2.1   Commitment Trees 
In order to obtain a tractable model for handling contractual commitments, we use a 
tree-based representation for interdependent obligations. This representation is useful 
for understanding the simulation model that we use. 
When establishing contracts, agents create a network of directed obligations, some 
of which are dependent on the fulfillment or violation of other obligations. Consider 
the following two-party contract: agent a will pay p units to agent b, after which b 
will deliver x to a. In case b fails to deliver, he must return p’=p+δ to a. This  
sequence of commitments is illustrated in Figure 1, in a tree-like structure – a com-
mitment tree1. Each node represents an obligation, and each labeled directed edge 
indicates, in the child node pointed to, what follows when the obligation contained in 
the parent node is fulfilled (Fulf) or violated (Viol). Note that in this simple example 
nothing is specified yet if agent a violates his commitment to pay p, nor if agent b 
violates his commitment to return p’. 
The violation of an obligation with a prescribed sanction may simply denote a case 
where an agent preferred to incur the sanctions for matters of conflicting goals (e.g. 
he had another contract which was more important than this one, and could not stand 
for both). If such violation becomes frequent, however, this may denote a flaw in the 
normative system that agents are being able to exploit to their own advantage. 
The importance of adaptation in a normative framework resides in the fact that 
contracts may be unfair in certain execution outcomes. If self-interested agents try to 
explore such flaws to their own profit, action should be taken so as to discourage such 
behaviors. Aiming at a model that adapts the normative framework in a domain-
independent way, we focus on adding deterrence fines to the system (which are not 
violable), instead of adjusting prescribed obligations in each violation situation. 
                                                          
1
 Although the commitment structure may be more complex, we simplify it to a binary tree; 
while not limiting the applicability of our adaptation approach, this choice makes the model 
easier to follow. 
  
 
Fig. 1. Sample commitment tree 
The normative framework’s adaptation is based on associating, with each obliga-
tion, a fine that can be strengthened or weakened. With this approach, every obliga-
tion will have a (potentially null) fine to be imposed on the bearer in case of violation; 
this fine is added up to the violation consequence in the child node already in the tree, 
if there is one. The fine-update function is based on fine application frequency. Fines 
will increase when they are applied often, and decrease when they are not used. A low 
level of fine usage indicates that obligations are being fulfilled or they are not being 
used as often as desired: in both cases fines should be decreased, since they either are 
not needed or are inhibiting activity. On the other hand, a high level of fine usage 
means that agents still prefer to go through the sanction, and as such it should be 
increased as a deterrence mechanism. In sum, this approach tries to make fines (a) 
strong enough to discourage deviation and (b) weak enough to avoid unnecessary 
institutional control. 
2.2   Contract Enactment 
We developed a simulation prototype that allows us to experiment with the adaptation 
model briefly introduced above. In our system we shall have a number of agents that 
will each be given an opportunity to sign a contract. The contract structure is defined 
by a number of enacting roles and by an underlying binary commitment tree (BCT 
from now on). Roles are used as bearers or counterparties of the obligations in the 
tree. Furthermore, each obligation has an associated cost (to be supported by a fulfill-
ing bearer) and benefit (to be collected by the counterparty of a fulfilled obligation). 
Figure 2 more clearly depicts the characterization of each node in a BCT. 
 
 
Fig. 2. A BCT node and its configuration 
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 When an agent decides to sign a contract, he will enact the corresponding com-
mitment tree with a role assigned to him before contracting. We say that the state of a 
contract enactment is the commitment currently under appreciation. If the bearer of 
such a commitment is the agent that decided to contract, he will be asked for a play: 
either to fulfill or to violate such a commitment. If the commitment’s bearer is not the 
agent, the system will decide whether the commitment will be fulfilled or not, accord-
ing to a uniform strategy. The current state will be updated according to the decision 
taken: if the choice is to fulfill, the state will become the root commitment of the 
fulfillment sub-tree; if the choice is to violate, the state will become the root commit-
ment of the violation sub-tree. The contract terminates when the state reaches a null 
value (no fulfillment/violation sub-tree exists upon a fulfill/violate decision). 
2.3   Agent Decision-Making 
Each agent has two distinct kinds of decisions to make. If he does not have an ongo-
ing contract, he is given the opportunity to sign one. For that, a random role from the 
contract structure is selected and the agent is asked if he wants to contract with that 
role. Each agent is configured with a risk tolerance parameter Rt ∈ [0; 1[, which 
denotes his willingness to contract in the presence of violation fines. If Rt = 0, the 
agent decides to contract only if he will be subject to no fines at all. If Rt ≈ 1, the 
agent will always risk to contract, regardless of any fines. An agent will decide to 
contract depending on the highest fine that is associated with commitments for the 
assigned role. In order to contract, the following relation should be true: 
highestFine(role) ≤ b * Rt / (1 – Rt) (1) 
where b is a slope parameter associated with the agent’s budget. We assume that 
agents always prefer to contract, regardless of commitment costs or benefits. The 
contract is presumably beneficial to all partners should they fulfill their commitments. 
When an agent has an ongoing contract, if the current state is a commitment with 
him as the bearer he will decide whether to fulfill or to violate. Depending on a so-
called in-contract strategy, the agent will explore the contract’s BCT in order to de-
cide which option is best for him. Such strategies may vary from simply comparing 
the cost of fulfillment with the applicable fine in case of violation, to computing the 
path with the best outcome from the whole BCT (more on this in Section 3.2). 
Agents are essentially expected utility maximizers. This means that, in principle, 
they will fulfill obligations only when the expected outcome from this choice is better 
than the expected outcome from violating (according to the employed in-contract 
strategy). We do however embed in our agents some notion of social welfare, which 
impels them to fulfill even when they do not have a strict advantage in doing so. 
While for now we do not consider the effect of reputation in future contracts, we 
allow in our model that agents are not all equally self-interested. For that we introduce 
a social awareness parameter Sa ∈ [0; 1[. If Sa = 0, the agent will violate whenever 
the outcome from this choice is better than the outcome from fulfilling. On the other 
extreme, if Sa ≈ 1 the agent will always choose to fulfill. The agent will decide to 
fulfill an obligation o whenever the following relation is true: 
violationOutcome(o) – fulfillmentOutcome(o) ≤ b * Sa / (1 – Sa) (2) 
 where b is a slope parameter associated with the agent’s budget. The violation and 
fulfillment outcomes are calculated by the in-contract strategy. 
2.4   Fine-Update Policy 
After all agents running in the simulation have a chance to play, the contract structure 
will adapt, that is, fines associated to the BCT will be updated. Each fine is updated 
independently of all other fines. 
In order to delineate a fine update policy, we first need to define the goal function 
that will be pursuit. As mentioned before, fine updates should take into account how 
often they are applied. We define a threshold parameter Th ∈ [0; 1] that indicates the 
highest percentage of fines that the system should accept as normal. For instance, with 
a value Th = 0.1 we are saying that if more than 10% of the agents running in the 
simulation violate a given obligation, the normative system will raise the fine in the 
next step – we say that 10% of the total number of agents is the number of tolerated 
violations. Furthermore, since not all agents will be in the same state at a given time 
point, we adjust the threshold according to the number of agents that did in fact make 
a decision concerning the fulfillment or violation of a specific obligation (because 
they were in that state). A state’s fine will be increased if the number of violations 
exceeds the following tolerated violations function: 
toleratedViolations = 2*Th*Nag / (1 + e-(5/Nag)*x) – Th*Nag (3) 
where Nag is the number of agents running in the simulation and x is the number of 
agents that were in this state. This is a sigmoid function with an upper bound set at 
Th*Nag (a percentage of the total number of agents). 
The system should keep fines as low as possible, while still conforming to the goal 
function outlined above. This is because the overall goal of the system is to maximize 
contract activity, which should be obtained with less risk exposure in an agent popula-
tion with unknown risk tolerance. Therefore, whenever the number of violations does 
not exceed the number of tolerated violations, the fine will be decreased. Fines are 
increased heavier than they are decreased. We have set an increase step of 0.1 and a 
decrease step of 0.01. Fines will be applied rounded to the first decimal place, which 
gives a sense that it takes ten simulation steps (without exceeding the tolerated viola-
tions function) to decrease the fine value. 
3   Scenario 
In this section we present a scenario on which experiences reported in Section 4 are 
based. We show the deterrence sanction adaptation in a uniform distribution setting. 
3.1   Contract Structure 
Since we are not concerned with the correctness of the contract to be signed, we may 
experiment with a large number of different BCTs (some arbitrary examples can be 
found in [9]). However, for space limitations we will concentrate on a simple contract 
structure with two roles, whose BCT is illustrated in Figure 3. This BCT includes two 
complementary obligations 0 and 1, and their respective contrary-to-duties 3 and 2. 
We shall call obligation 1 the to-duty obligation of obligation 0. 
  
Fig. 3. Binary commitment tree for a contract structure with two roles: each node Idi,j is an 
obligation where i is the bearer and j is the counterparty. This BCT includes two complemen-
tary obligations (0 and 1) and their contrary-to-duties (3 and 2). 
For all experiments reported in this paper, obligation costs are set at 10.0 and bene-
fits at 12.0 (setting benefits higher than costs tries to give all partners some gain when 
the contract is well-balanced). Also, fines are initialized at 0.0. 
3.2   Agent In-Contract Strategy 
As explained in Section 2.3, when deciding whether to comply with commitments 
agents use an in-contract strategy in order to compute the violation/fulfillment out-
comes. Several in-contract strategies can be devised (see [9] for some examples), 
representing the reasoning abilities of agents when deciding whether to fulfill or vio-
late an obligation. 
In this paper we will assume that agents are capable of analyzing the whole BCT, 
in order to compute the path that will bring them the best possible outcome when 
assuming that the contract partner will use the same strategy. This is a minimax strat-
egy: the agent will maximize his own expected utility while assuming that the other 
agent will do the same. For instance, considering the BCT at Figure 3 with no fines, 
the agent will choose to violate on every obligation. While this seems obvious for 
obligations 1, 2 and 3 (there is no personal benefit in fulfilling), in obligation 0 the 
agent chooses to violate because he assumes that the counterparty will violate on 1 
and 2, bringing him no benefit that can compensate the cost of fulfilling on 0. 
This strategy seems counterintuitive with the very decision of establishing a con-
tract. However, for the sake of testing the adaptation capabilities of the normative 
framework, this agent decision practice is bearable. 
For all experiments reported in this paper, a uniform strategy “always fulfill” is 
used by the system for commitments whose bearer is not a simulation agent. 
3.3   Adaptation to Population with Uniform Distribution 
When addressing an agent population with uniform distributions over risk tolerance 
(Rt) and social awareness (Sa) parameters, the adaptation of fines proceeds as illus-
trated in Figure 4. Every agent will start violating every obligation, which causes an 
increase of every fine. However, when fines 3 and 2 are high enough, fines 0 and 1 
are no longer necessary to persuade agents to fulfill the respective obligations. 
We should emphasize that the system tries continuously to lower fines, which is 
observable by the slight fluctuations of fines towards the end of the curves in figure 4. 
Therefore, system imposed fine levels are the lowest that keep violations below the 
tolerated violations function. 
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 Fig. 4. Fine evolution (Th=0.1, Nag=10000) for 1000 simulation steps with uniform distribu-
tions of risk tolerance and social awareness 
4   Adaptation to Different Agent Populations 
In this section we analyze the adaptation of the system when handling different agent 
populations, in which risk tolerance and social awareness distributions are concerned. 
4.1   Risk Tolerance 
With this first group of experiments we aimed at observing the behavior of the deter-
rence sanction adaptation model when facing agent populations with different risk  
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Fine evolution (Th=0.1, Nag=10000) for 1000 simulation steps with different beta dis-
tributions of risk tolerance and uniform distributions of social awareness 
 tolerance distributions. In a population that tends to be more risk-averse, higher fines 
should tend to decrease. In these experiments we used beta distributions centered at 
different risk tolerance values, in order to represent populations having a predomi-
nance of agents with specific risk tolerances. For each beta distribution, we set 
α=1+(c*p-c) and β=p-(c*p-c), where c is the center value and p is a peak factor that 
we have set to 100. 
Figure 5 shows fine evolutions for different risk tolerance center values. As ex-
pected, higher fines tend to decrease with lower risk tolerance values. This is due to 
the fact that, when deciding whether to contract or not, agents compare risk tolerance 
with the highest applicable fine. 
Another interesting observation is that while the highest fines tend to decrease, the 
system tries to compensate this potentially lower ability to ascertain the desired level 
of compliance by increasing other sanctions. More specifically, since fines 3 and 2 are 
lowered, they lose their effect on decisions taken in states 0 and 1, respectively. As a 
consequence, fines in these states are raised. 
This outcome turns out to be an important emergent property of the normative sys-
tem: the ability to grasp interdependencies between fines applied to different nodes in 
the BCT, without being preprogrammed to do so (the fine update policy adapts fines 
in an independent way). Furthermore, such interdependencies are caused by the in-
contract strategy used by agents; if agents do not take into account possible “future” 
fines when making a decision (see [9]), then the system behavior will not pointlessly 
make a connection between fines. 
4.2   Social Awareness 
With this second group of experiments we aimed at observing the behavior of the 
deterrence sanction adaptation model when facing agent populations with different 
social awareness distributions. In a population that tends to be more socially con-
cerned, fines should tend to decrease. Selfish agents will only fulfill if it is in their 
own interest, while higher social awareness impels agents to fulfill even when they do 
not benefit directly from that option. 
Figure 6 shows fine evolutions for different social awareness center values (using 
beta distributions as before). As expected, fines tend to increase with lower social 
awareness values. By doing so, the system tries to discourage commitment violations.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Fine evolution (Th=0.1, Nag=10000) for 1000 simulation steps with uniform distribu-
tions of risk tolerance and different beta distributions of social awareness 
 The dependency mentioned before between fines is also visible here: fines 3 and 2 
tend to absorb the effects of fines 0 and 1 sooner for higher social awareness values, 
and the system is able to find these intricacies. 
4.3   Combining Risk Tolerance and Social Awareness 
By adjusting both parameters when setting up an agent population, we get a combina-
tion of the effects identified above. Figure 7 shows what happens when we set both 
risk tolerance and social awareness to beta distributions centered at 0.1. In this case, 
since highest fines are limited by a low risk tolerance, the system raises fines 0 and 1 
as much as it can, in order to try to force a population of mostly self-interested and 
risk-averse agents to contract and also comply with contractual commitments. We 
should add that in these extreme and unlikely conditions the normative system is not 
successful: the obtained fine levels are insufficient to force compliance, and at the 
same time too demanding to motivate contractual activity. This means that the few 
agents that do contract (which nevertheless are in essence risk-averse) will violate 
their commitments (because they are also too self-interested). 
 
Fig. 7. Fine evolution (Th=0.1, Nag=10000) for 1000 simulation steps with beta distributions of 
risk tolerance and social awareness centered at 0.1 
5   Conclusions 
Embedding adaptive enforcement mechanisms in normative frameworks is important 
in open environments. Adapting deterrence levels to the behavior of an agent popula-
tion is important when the normative space has imperfections that make the contracts 
to which norms apply unfair, opening the possibility for self-interested agents to ex-
ploit their potential advantage. 
In this paper we have studied how an adaptive deterrence sanction model that tries 
to “maintain order” responds when facing different agent populations. Such popula-
tions were characterized by a predominant level of risk tolerance and social aware-
ness. The former is inspired on economic theory on deterrence sanctions [7], stating 
that agents incur a risk when making contracts that are subject to deterrence sanctions. 
The latter is comparable to other approaches in MAS research that try to model dif-
ferent social attitudes (e.g. [2, 10]). 
With the adaptive model described in this paper, imposed fines tend to be lower 
when agents are more risk-averse or when agents are more socially concerned. Also, 
we observed that when a combination of sanctions is able to drive agents to comply 
with their commitments, the adaptive mechanism is able to pursue such a combination 
when constraints limit some options – such constraints are rooted in the agent popula-
tion (namely the predominant risk tolerance), and are implicitly captured in the fine 
update policy. This ability is an interesting emergent property of the system. 
Dynamic properties of normative systems have been studied from different per-
spectives. In [11] norms are seen as patterns of behavior that may emerge from agent 
interactions. In our case, the normative system is external to the agents; we seek to 
adapt it to a specific agent population in order to pursue an overall system goal. 
Sanction-based self-adaptation of institutional normative environments is also 
studied in [12]. However, their adaptation model is based on the definition of domain-
dependent transition functions, stating what specific change should be made in a spe-
cific norm when some goal specification is not met. Also, their model does not  
assume strict liability: agents are able to violate norms while not being detected. 
In this paper we have not considered the influence of reputation on agent’s con-
tractual behavior. It has been argued [13] that in the presence of reputation mecha-
nisms there is a lesser need for deterrence policies. We leave for future work such 
analysis. 
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